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We present a comprehensive computational study on the effects of providing different forms of
incomplete preference information in additive group decision models. We consider different types of
information on individual preferences, and on weights of the group members, and study their effects on
conclusiveness, efﬁciency and fairness of outcomes at the group level. Furthermore, we analyze possible
violations of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) as well as the impact of problem
characteristics, in particular initial agreement between group members. Our results indicate that
providing information in the form of a ranking of differences between consecutive alternatives comes
close to providing exact cardinal preference information in several outcome dimensions. However, group
decision procedures based on incomplete preference information also show a signiﬁcant amount of
violations of the IIA axiom.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The problem of aggregating individual preferences to a group
preference on a set of alternatives has for centuries been of central
importance to many ﬁelds of research such as political science,
economics or decision theory. A seminal contribution to the ﬁeld was
made by Arrow [1], who in his famous impossibility theorem showed
that it is not possible to aggregate ordinal preferences (rankings of
alternatives) in a way which is consistent with ﬁve plausible
requirements. Using very similar axioms, Keeney [2] later showed
that a consistent aggregation of cardinal preferences (utility values of
alternatives measured on an interval scale) is possible and that a
weighted sum of individual utilities provides a group utility function
which fulﬁlls all Arrow's requirements. The idea of an additive
aggregation of cardinal preferences was introduced already earlier
in the literature [3,4], and many researchers have extended and
elaborated this concept later on [5–9].
However, providing cardinal evaluations of alternatives is a
more demanding task for group members than providing just a
ranking of alternatives. The beneﬁts of consistent aggregation of
individual opinions therefore must be traded off against the higher
cognitive burden that this approach places on group members.
The difﬁculties of providing exact cardinal values for the
evaluation of alternatives, or at a more detailed level for some
parameters of an underlying preference model (like weights to be
assigned to different attributes) are well known in the area of
decision analysis. To overcome these difﬁculties, many methods
have been developed, which require only partial or incomplete
information on a decision maker's preferences [10–19, e.g.]. Some
of these methods, which are often labeled as disaggregation
approaches [20,21] or robust ordinal regression approaches [22],
actually use a ranking of alternatives as input from which they
estimate parameters of a cardinal preference model. One could
therefore view these methods as bridging the gap between
cardinal and ordinal preference information.
Decision methods using incomplete information have also been
proposed in the context of group decision making [22–27]. At the
group level, incomplete information refers to the weights of group
members in the aggregation procedure. At the individual level,
incomplete information can either directly refer to the (cardinal)
evaluation of alternatives by group members, or to some para-
meters of the underlying preference model (which in some
methods is also an additive utility model).
In the present paper, we elaborate on the idea that decision
methods using incomplete information cover a middle ground
between cardinal and ordinal preference information. We study
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the effects of providing such information in different ways, which
represent different points on the spectrum between cardinal and
ordinal information. To provide a comprehensive analysis of the
effects of different preference information, we consider a variety of
outcome dimensions like conclusiveness of results or potential
differences in the inﬂuence of group members. Since methods that
rely on ordinal information (which is a boundary case in the
spectrum of information levels we study) must necessarily violate
at least one of Arrow's axioms, we also take such violations into
account. In particular, we focus on the axiom of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Furthermore, we also study the impact of
problem characteristics on our results. We analyze all these
questions using a computational model.
The following section gives a brief overview of group decision
methods using incomplete information and presents the speciﬁc
approach on which our study is built. Section 3 deﬁnes the
research questions in detail. Section 4 provides details about the
computational study and the results are presented in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses the results from the study and Section 7 offers
some conclusions and suggests topics for further research.
2. Incomplete information in group decision making
2.1. A brief review
In the context of group decision aiding methods (see [27] for a
review on negotiation support methods) there are different
approaches to exploit the incomplete information provided by
the decision makers (DMs): establishing robust (necessary) con-
clusions, assessing stability domains, and aggregating the informa-
tion into a consensus result.
One class of approaches derives robust conclusions about the
alternatives in the sense that these conclusions are veriﬁed for all the
parameter values compatible with the incomplete information
provided. These approaches usually look for preference relations
among alternatives that necessarily occur. If one alternative is better
than another one for all parameter vectors compatible with the
incomplete information (possibly equally good for a subset of these
vectors), then the latter alternative is said to be dominated. Such
methods can also examine conclusions that hold for at least one
parameter vector, namely to ﬁnd out which alternatives may have
the highest utility. If there exists any parameter vector compatible
with the incomplete information such that an alternative has the
highest utility, then this alternative is said to be potentially optimal.
For example, Salo [6] ﬁnds dominance relations using mathematical
programming approaches. Dias and Clímaco [24]'s framework pro-
poses relaxing the concept of dominance considering a tolerance and
a majority level. Greco et al. [22] use mathematical programming to
identify necessary (dominance) or possible preference relations as
consequences of indirect preference information provided by each
DM, or agreed by the DMs.
A second class of approaches is based on assessing the domains
of the parameter space that support some conclusions. These
domains are considered as volumes of the parameter space (when
such space is a polyhedron deﬁned by linear constraints) or
probabilities derived from a stochastic analysis (when parameter
values are modeled as random variables having stochastic dis-
tributions). These interpretations coincide if the distributions are
all uniform and independent. An early example is Bana e Costa
[28], proposing the computation of an acceptability index combin-
ing individual preferences. Another example is SMAA, which uses
Monte-Carlo simulation to compute for example the probability
that an alternative occupies each position in the ranking of all
alternatives; these probabilities are then aggregated into an
indicator of the support for each alternative [23]. These
approaches can be combined with the ﬁrst group [29] to provide
more comprehensive information to decision makers.
A third class of approaches performs an aggregation of the
incomplete information to directly derive a result (e.g., a ranking
of the alternatives), or to yield a compromise vector of parameter
values. As an example of the former (deriving a result directly), the
interactive approach of Mateos et al. [25] uses Monte-Carlo
simulation based on the incomplete information from the DMs
to propose a ranking based on the mean utility of the alternatives.
Another interactive approach, by Kim and Ahn [30], uses mathe-
matical programming and net-ﬂow aggregation to propose a
ranking of the alternatives. Other methods yield a consensus
parameter vector, which can later be used to obtain a ranking of
the alternatives. This includes methods based on distances (e.g.,
[26]) and methods based on ordinal regression (e.g. [31]).
Let us note that it is possible to combine several of these
approaches when dealing with a group decision or a negotiation
situation [27].
2.2. Preference model and decision procedure
We consider a decision problem in which a group consisting of
Nmem DMs has to rank a set A of Nalt alternatives or has to identify
the best of these alternatives. We follow an additive aggregation
approach based on e.g. Keeney and Kirkwood [4] and Dyer and
Sarin [5]. In the case of complete information, the group utility of
an alternative AiAA can be written as
vðAiÞ ¼ ∑
Nmem
m ¼ 1
wmvmðAiÞ ð2:1Þ
where wm is the importance weight of group member m, and vmðÞ
is the value function of that DM. For a given and ﬁnite set of
alternatives, there is only a ﬁnite set of values that each DM has to
provide. To simplify the notation, we therefore denote the value
which DM m assigns to the alternative Ai by vim. We thus can
rewrite (2.1) as
vðAiÞ ¼ ∑
Nmem
m ¼ 1
wmvim: ð2:2Þ
We use notation Aigm Aj to denote that Ai is preferred to Aj by
a group member m (i.e., vim4v
j
m), whereas AigAj denotes that Ai
is preferred to Aj by the group.
Incomplete information can refer both to the weights wm of the
group members and to the individual evaluations vim. In the
present study, we consider both values to be uncertain. We follow
a volume-based approach, which considers the uncertain para-
meters to be uniformly distributed across their respective
domains, and use a Monte-Carlo method to sample parameter
vectors which are compatible with the preference information
available. Group members provide some information about pre-
ferences (e.g. a ranking of alternatives), and the method then
generates values of the vim in a ﬁxed interval between zero and one
which are compatible with this information. At the group level, we
do not consider additional (problem speciﬁc) information on
member weights (although such information could in principle
also be accommodated), but we only consider a priori restrictions
on these weights resulting from technical conditions like the
scaling of weights, or variants of the non-dictatorship axiom.
For each parameter vector in the sample, the method calculates
the group utilities of all alternatives. Since we follow a domain-
based approach, we utilize the sampled group utilities to calculate
two sets of indices. Both refer to probabilities and are approxi-
mated via the fraction of all the sampled parameter vectors which
fulﬁll the corresponding conditions. Following the terminology of
Kadzinski and Tervonen [29], these two indices are designated as
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1. Pair-wise outranking indices pij, which indicate the probability
(fraction of parameter vectors analyzed) that alternative Ai is
preferred to alternative Aj at the group level.
2. Rank acceptability indices rik, which indicate the probability
that alternative Ai obtains rank k in the group ranking.
These two sets of indices form the basic results of the group
decision procedure under incomplete information which we study
here. From them, further information can be derived to support the
group in its decision process. For example, the probabilities ri1
indicate that an alternative Ai can obtain the best rank, so the set
of alternative fAi : ri140g identiﬁes the set of potentially optimal
alternatives. Similarly, for each alternative the set of possible ranks
that this alternative may obtain can be computed. If pij ¼ 1 for some
pair of alternatives Ai and Aj, the group considers alternative Ai to be
better than Aj for all parameter vectors sampled and thus we can say
that Ai (approximately) dominates Aj. Note that due to the ﬁnite
sample size, it still cannot be said that no compatible parameters
exist for which Aj would be considered to be better than Ai, thus
dominance is only approximate (given the sample). Although it is
possible to use optimization models to determine whether such
parameters exist [29], this is not a topic of our research and we
therefore limit our analysis to the simulation results.
3. Research questions
The main objective of this paper is to study the impact of
different forms of incomplete information on the outcomes of the
group decision procedure outlined in Section 2. We thus can
formulate our main research question as follows:
How do different levels of incomplete information (on the values
which group members assign to alternatives and on member
weights) affect the outcomes at the group level?
To be more speciﬁc, we are interested in several dimensions of
the group result. Since the procedure generates probabilistic infor-
mation about preferences at the group level, a key issue is the
conclusiveness of results. If the outcome of the procedure indicates
that any alternative might be optimal with about the same prob-
ability, this result will not provide much support for the group in its
decision making task. It is quite obvious that providing more precise
inputs on the group member's preferences will lead to more
conclusive results (e.g., fewer alternatives being identiﬁed as poten-
tially optimal). The ranking of different information levels in terms of
conclusiveness is therefore easily predictable. However, it is not only
the ranking that is important here, but also the differences, i.e., how
much does conclusiveness improve when information becomes
richer. To perform this type of analysis, we not only study the cases
of purely cardinal and purely ordinal information, but also an
intermediate level, in which group members provide a ranking of
the differences between alternatives in addition to a ranking of
alternatives. By considering the differences in outcomes, we can
determine whether this kind of information produces results which
are closer to cardinal or to ordinal preference information.
Outcomes of group decisions, even if they are exact and not
probabilistic, can still be evaluated according to several dimen-
sions. Two obvious dimensions are fairness, i.e. how balanced the
result is in reﬂecting the interests of different group members, and
efﬁciency [32,33]. It is easy to show (as we will provide in the
following section) that the proposed approach will only identify
efﬁcient alternatives as potentially optimal. By varying group
members' weights, it allows for scanning the set of efﬁcient
alternatives, and we study how well this set can be explored using
different types of information. With respect to fairness, different
levels of incomplete information might have other effects. Cardinal
information about a group member's preferences implicitly gives
more weight to group members who state that the difference
between two alternatives is rather large for them compared to
group members who indicate that the same alternatives for them
are close to each other. By moving towards ordinal information,
we expect the inﬂuence of group members on the ﬁnal results to
be more evenly distributed.
To summarize these considerations, we can therefore formulate
our ﬁrst research question more precisely as follows:
Research question 1 (RQ 1): What is the impact of different
levels of information on group members' values of alternatives,
and on the weights of group members, on outcomes, in particular:
 How much does the provision of information on differences in
values improve the conclusiveness of results, compared to
providing just rankings?
 How well can the set of efﬁcient alternatives be scanned using
different types of preference information and weights?
 What is the impact of providing different levels of information
on the balance of inﬂuence by group members on the group
outcomes?
Another aim of this study is to explore the limits of the proposed
approach. Since Arrow's impossibility theorem [1] is a general result
for any social choice function operating on ordinal preferences, it is
obvious that the proposed approach must also violate at least one of
Arrow's axioms. The critical issue here is Arrow's Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) condition, which basically states that the
ranking of any two alternatives by the group must not change
depending on the availability of a third (the “irrelevant”) alternative.
If an alternative which is either the best or the worst in one
member's ranking is dropped, this will affect the scaling of values
of that member and consequently the outcomes of the procedure.
However, for actual applications of the procedure, the question
is not whether such rank reversals can theoretically occur, but to
which extent they will actually affect the results of the procedure.
Thus, we will use our computational model also to answer the
following research question.
Research question 2 (RQ 2): How frequently do violations of the
IIA condition occur for different levels of information on group
members' preferences and on weights?
Finally, results of computational studies always depend on the
speciﬁc settings being analyzed. Apart from problem dimensions such
as the number of alternatives and groupmembers, which can easily be
set for the simulations and for which we can study a wide range of
possible values, more subtle characteristics of the problem might also
have an impact on results. In particular, it might make a difference
whether the group members already have very similar preferences
about the alternatives in discussion, or whether there is strong
disagreement among group members. Consider for example the
extreme case in which all group members fully agree on the ranking
of alternatives. In that case the group result will obviously always be
the same ranking as that of all members, regardless of the kind of
information provided, and all the effects to be analyzed in the previous
two research questions will disappear. Therefore, we intend to study.
Research question 3 (RQ 3): What is the impact of problem
characteristics, in particular, level of conﬂict, on the relationships
postulated in RQ1 and RQ2?
4. Computational study
4.1. Model overview
To analyze our research questions, we performed a computa-
tional study in which we simulated the use of different types of
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incomplete information in a group decision problem following the
approach outlined in Section 2. In this study, we compared three
levels of information on values of alternatives, as well as three
levels of information on group member weights. Concerning
values of alternatives, the following variants were used.
 Full cardinal information (C): As a benchmark, we assumed that
group members are able to specify the exact cardinal utility
values for each alternative.
 Ranking of differences (D): Here we assumed that group mem-
bers provide a ranking of alternatives, as well as a ranking of
differences of adjacent alternatives in their rankings.
 Ranking of alternatives (R): As the weakest level of preference
information, we assumed that each group member only pro-
vides a personal ranking of alternatives.
To a certain extent, the assumption of full cardinal information
contradicts the main aim of decision models under incomplete
information to simplify the cognitive task for the decision makers.
We therefore view this setting mainly as a benchmark, against
which the other two more realistic settings can be evaluated and
which provides information on the loss of precision due to
providing only incomplete information.
The three levels of information on member weights used were
the following:
 Equal weights (E): As a benchmark, we used a setting with equal
weights for all group members. While it would be possible to
simulate “true” unequal weights, such a setting would not
provide additional insights. By such an approach, we could
have studied the difference between arbitrary vectors and
equal weights, but this question is not a topic of our study.
 Non-dictator weights (N): As a second level, we considered all
weight vectors ðw1;…;wNmem Þ which fulﬁll the condition
wmr0:5 and thus the condition of independence of an
imposed winner as deﬁned in Dias and Sarabando [34].
Furthermore, we considered ∑Nmemm ¼ 1wm ¼ 1 and wmZ0 8m. General weights (G): As the third level, we considered arbitrary
weight vectors fulﬁlling the conditions ∑Nmemm ¼ 1wm ¼ 1 and
wmZ0 8m.
In total, we thus considered 3 3¼ 9 different information
settings. In the following, we will denote these information
settings by two letter codes representing the information level
on values and on member weights as indicated in the above lists.
Thus, for example “DN” refers to a setting on which a ranking of
differences (D) is speciﬁed for values, and non-dictatorship
weights (N) are used for the group members.
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the simulation framework. For each
simulation experiment, a random problem instance was generated
by drawing Nalt  Nmem random values (one for each of the Nalt
alternatives and each of the Nmem group members) from a uniform
distribution. These values were subsequently rescaled, so that the
best alternative in each member's ranking received a value of one,
and the worst alternative a value of zero. For this study, we thus
considered evaluations of group members to be completely inde-
pendent of each other. This could, for example, reﬂect a setting in
which group members represent different interests and thus evalu-
ate alternatives according to different (and uncorrelated) criteria.
Given these “true” cardinal values, the simulation program
then calculated the ranking of alternatives, and the ranking of
differences between adjacent alternatives for each member. These
rankings were used as an input to the analysis as outlined in
Section 2. In the case of true cardinal values, these values were
directly used. For information level “R” (rankings), the procedure
generated Nalt random values for each group member, which were
subsequently rescaled to the zero-one interval, sorted, and assigned
to alternatives according to the group member's ranking. For
information level “D” (differences of values), we used a variant of
the method of Butler et al. [35], as described in [19]. Member weights
for the general setting (type “G”) were also generated using the
method of Butler et al. [35]. For the non-dictator weights, we used a
rejection method and generated weight vectors until one was found
which did not contain any weight larger than 0.5.
One of our research questions addresses the IIA property. For
this analysis, we subsequently dropped each alternative from the
original problem and repeated the analysis for each reduced
problem. In cases in which the best or worst alternative of a group
member is dropped, this will lead to a different scaling of the
generated random values assigned to alternatives, which could
generate violations of the IIA axiom.
To test the sensitivity of our results for different parameter
settings, we performed experiments for different problem dimen-
sions. Table 1 summarizes the main parameter setting used for
this study.
In the following Section 5, we will only present results referring
to the extreme parameter values (shown in boldface in Table 1).
The remaining results lie in between those extreme results, and
can be obtained from the authors.
The simulation program was implemented in Object Pascal
using the open source Free Pascal compiler (www.freepascal.org).
The source code can be obtained from the authors upon request.
4.2. Measurement of outcome variables
As explained in Section 2.2, the group decision procedure
generates pairwise outranking indices pij and rank acceptability
indices rik, which provide probabilistic information on the group
Fig. 1. Simulation framework.
Table 1
Simulation parameter settings.
Parameter Values used
Number of group members 3, 5, 7, 9
Number of alternatives 5, 10, 15, 20
Problem instances generated 2000
Parameter vectors for each problem instance 10,000
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ranking. From this data, we derive measures to analyze our
research questions. The ﬁrst research question deals with the
impact of different information levels on the efﬁciency, fairness,
and conclusiveness of results. So we need to measure these three
concepts.
We consider the outcome of a simulation to be conclusive if it
strongly reduces the number of alternatives that should be
considered by the group. To measure conclusiveness, we therefore
consider the number of potentially optimal alternatives i.e. alter-
natives for which ri140.
Even in the case of information level “R” (only ranks of
alternatives are provided), inefﬁcient alternatives cannot be poten-
tially optimal. An alternative Ai is inefﬁcient if there exists an
alternative Aj such that Aj is preferred over Ai by all group
members. Thus any randomly generated set of values will assign
a higher value to Aj for each group member than to alternative Ai,
yielding necessarily a higher group utility and the result that
pij ¼ 0. Since only the efﬁcient alternatives can be potentially
optimal, the main information that can be derived is therefore
how much of the efﬁcient set can actually be explored by using
random weights and/or values. It should be noted that neither
having one optimal alternative nor covering the entire set of
efﬁcient alternatives is necessarily the best result; both types of
results provide valuable information to the DMs. One interesting
aspect in this context is whether the intermediate forms of
incomplete information (non-dictator weights and information
on differences) are closer to the case of exact values, or to the case
of most incomplete information we consider here.
Apart from efﬁciency, we also consider fairness. A group
ranking can be considered to be balanced if the rankings of
individual members are equally well represented in the group
ranking. For an exact group ranking, one could therefore use some
measure of correlation between group and individual rankings.
However, the pairwise outranking indices provide only probabil-
istic information. To measure the correspondence between this
group level information and the ranking of member m, we deﬁne
the following index of correspondence with the group ranking:
GCm ¼
∑
Nalt
i ¼ 1
∑
j:Aigm Aj
pij
ðNaltðNalt1ÞÞ=2
ð4:3Þ
where Aigm Aj indicates that memberz m prefers Ai over Aj. Note
that we use the sum of probabilities, so GCm is the average
probability that for any pair of alternatives, the ranking of that
pair by the group corresponds to the member's ranking. Assuming
that all pij are independent of each other (which is obviously not
the case, since for a given parameter vector the group ranking is
transitive), one could calculate the probability that the group
ranking fully agrees with the member's ranking as the product
of these probabilities. However, the product would be zero in case
that the group never agrees with the member on just two
alternatives, so we consider the average deﬁned in (4.3) as the
more robust measure. A value of GCm¼1 would mean that for all
parameter vectors, the group always agrees with the member on
the ranking on any two alternatives, indicating that the member
has a very strong inﬂuence on the group. Thus, we can consider
the inﬂuence of the most inﬂuential member as an indicator of
how balanced the group outcome is with respect to the individual
members' opinions.
However, GCm has still one major drawback, since it does not
account for the level of agreement between the rankings of group
members. If all members initially agree on the ranking of all
alternatives, we would obtain CGm¼1 for all members. Still we
should not conclude that the most inﬂuential member (which in
that case would be any member) is a dictator who always
determines the group outcome. To correct for this effect, we
propose to standardize GCm by the initial level of correspondence
between group members, which can be deﬁned analogously to
(4.3) as
MCm ¼
∑namjfði; jÞ : Aigm Aj4Aign Ajgj
Nalt  ðNalt1Þ  ðNmem1Þ=2
ð4:4Þ
which for each member counts the number of other members who
have the same preference on any pair of alternatives, standardized
by the number of other members ðNmem1Þ and the number of
pairs of alternatives Nalt  ðNalt1Þ=2. Thus MCm is the average
fraction of other members who agree with member m on the
ranking of any pair of alternatives. From these two values, we can
derive a measure of member m's inﬂuence as
IFm ¼
GCm
MCm
ð4:5Þ
In the spirit of “non-dictatorship”, we consider the highest
inﬂuence factor maxmIFm as an indicator of how (un-)balanced
the impact of members on the group decision is. As alternative
measures of the dispersion of inﬂuence factors, we also calculated
the range of IFm (i.e. maxmIFmminmIFm), and its standard devia-
tion. In Section 5, we only present results on maxmIFm, the other
results are provided in the online supplement to this paper.
The second research question addresses possible violations of
the IIA axiom. Here we have again a similar problem. Since the
analysis only yields probabilistic information, we ﬁrst have to
deﬁne what a rank reversal actually means in this context. For this
purpose, we consider the median rank of each alternative, and we
deﬁne a rank reversal to occur if in the presence of alternative Ak,
the median rank of alternative Ai is larger than that of alternative
Aj, while in the absence of alternative Ak, the median rank of Ai is
smaller than that of Aj.
We use the median rather than the mean rank for this analysis,
as the median is a more robust measure of location. Since median
ranks are integer values (or in the case of ties values halfway
between two integers), the median also provides a more clear-cut
deﬁnition of a rank reversal. Using the mean, two alternatives
could have fractional mean ranks which are very close to each
other, and which could be easily changed to two very close values
in the opposite order. Nevertheless, we conducted a similar
analysis also for mean ranks, the corresponding results are avail-
able in the online supplement to this paper.
If each alternative is dropped in turn, the maximum number of
rank reversals that can occur during such experiments is
NaltðNalt1ÞðNalt2Þ=2, so the actual number of rank reversals is
standardized by this factor to obtain comparable results.
Our last research question refers to the inﬂuence of the initial
level of conﬂict (or agreement) on outcomes. This can conveni-
ently be measured by the average value of MCm across group
members.
5. Results
5.1. RQ1: impact of information levels
Our ﬁrst research question concerned the impact of different
information levels on the conclusiveness of the results, as well as
on the efﬁciency and fairness of group results.
A main result of the incomplete information model is the set of
potentially optimal alternatives. Table 2 shows the average num-
ber of potentially optimal alternatives for the four extreme para-
meter settings studied. Obviously, for exact parameters, only one
alternative can be optimal (for randomly generated problems the
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probability of a tie is negligible), and this number increases the
less precise the information becomes.
Although Table 2 shows the absolute numbers of potentially
optimal alternatives in each of the four scenarios, the main
interpretation of the table lies in the comparison of different
information types within each problem size. Differences between
problem sizes depend on speciﬁc characteristics of each problem
size and should not be over-interpreted. In particular, the simula-
tion did not eliminate dominated alternatives from the problems,
since we considered the existence of dominated alternatives a
realistic scenario. Given that members do not know each other's
ranking, they might not even be aware that one alternative is
dominated (in terms of their individual rankings). Obviously, it is
more likely that an alternative is dominated in the case of only
three group members (compared to nine members), this partially
explains why numbers for the larger groups are higher. In fact, in
our simulation data, for three members on average only 66.21%
and 36.21% out of 5 and 20 alternatives respectively were efﬁcient,
whereas the number of efﬁcient alternatives is close to 100% for
nine members.
Comparing different information levels relative to each other, it
is clear from Table 2 that uncertainty about member weights has a
strong effect on outcomes. In the case of nine members, a large
fraction of alternatives can become optimal, even if member
weights are restricted to be less than 0.5. This restriction does
not have a strong effect in the case of nine members, since the
probability that any member will have such a large weight is very
small. In the simulations, on average only 1.0364 weight vectors
had to be generated for every weight vector fulﬁlling the non-
dictatorship condition in problems with nine members. In com-
parison, the ratio was 3.9998 for problems with three members.
Consequently, results for the two cases of uncertain member
weights are very similar for nine members.
Concerning the effect of uncertainty in values, providing informa-
tion on differences in values rather than just a ranking has a strong
effect. The set of potentially optimal alternatives in that case is almost
as small as in the case of exact values. A nonparametric Wilcoxon test
indicates that the difference between the number obtained for exact
values and a ranking of differences is always signiﬁcantly smaller
than the difference between the results obtained from a ranking of
differences and a ranking of alternatives. Information on weights and
utility values cannot directly be compared, since a ranking of
alternatives still provides some information, while in the case of
member weights the extreme scenario (general weights) does not
provide any information.
The set of potentially optimal alternatives also provides some
insight about efﬁciency of results. As we have already shown, an
alternative which is not Pareto optimal must have a probability of
zero of being the optimal alternative. Therefore, we only analyze
which fraction of efﬁcient alternatives is identiﬁed as potentially
optimal.
Fig. 2 provides an analysis relating potential optimality to the
actual efﬁciency of alternatives. It shows the distribution of the
ratio
number of potentially optimal alternatives
number of efficient alternatives
ð5:6Þ
Table 2
Average number of potentially optimal alternatives.
Values Weights All Weights All
Equal Non-dict General Equal Non-dict General
3 members 5 alternatives 9 members 5 alternatives
Card. 1.000 2.168 2.915 2.027 1.000 4.630 4.673 3.434
Diff. 1.837 2.801 3.138 2.592 1.999 4.718 4.756 3.824
Ranks 2.622 3.276 3.310 3.069 3.476 4.889 4.894 4.419
All 1.820 2.748 3.121 2.563 2.158 4.745 4.774 3.893
3 members 20 alternatives 9 members 20 alternatives
Card. 1.000 3.101 5.313 3.138 1.000 13.716 14.066 9.594
Diff. 1.731 3.757 5.654 3.714 1.807 13.898 14.214 9.973
Ranks 4.193 6.109 6.877 5.726 4.563 15.444 15.661 11.889
All 2.308 4.322 5.948 4.193 2.457 14.352 14.647 10.485
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Fig. 2. Fraction of efﬁcient alternatives identiﬁed as potentially optimal.
R. Vetschera et al. / Computers & Operations Research 51 (2014) 160–171 165
for each problem setting and information level. It should be noted
that in some problems, this measure cannot reach a value of one.
Alternatives, which are efﬁcient, but which are dominated by
some linear combination of other alternatives will not be optimal
for any weight vector, and thus will not be potentially optimal.
This is more likely to happen in the case of 20 alternatives, thus
the values shown in Fig. 2 are smaller for these problems.
Although in the case of exact values and equal weights, there is
only one potentially optimal alternative, the fraction in that case
varies, since the denominator of (5.6) is different between
problems.
Again, the distinction between non-dictator weights and gen-
eral weights becomes irrelevant for settings with nine group
members. In small problems (with ﬁve alternatives) almost all
efﬁcient alternatives can become optimal for at least some para-
meter vectors in the more uncertain settings. In contrast to the
previous results, providing a ranking of differences has not such a
strong effect, but rather is close to the middle between exact
values and providing only rankings.
As indicated in Section 4.2, we measure fairness of outcomes by
the relative inﬂuence of member rankings on the group results.
Table 3 shows the averages of maximum inﬂuence factors as
deﬁned in Eq. (4.5). Although some of the values are quite similar,
a Wilcoxon test indicates that results for all types of value
information, as well as for all types of weight information, are
signiﬁcantly different from each other at the po0:1% conﬁdence
level. As we expected, providing less information about prefer-
ences leads to a more equal inﬂuence of group members. Increas-
ing the number of alternatives decreases the maximum inﬂuence
of members, which is plausible since the group would then have to
agree with the member on the ranking of a larger number of
alternatives. Likewise, in larger groups each member has only a
smaller inﬂuence. In the large groups, the difference between non-
dictator weights and general weights is again very small (although
it is still statistically signiﬁcant here). We also ﬁnd again that
providing information about differences in values leads to results
which are more similar to the speciﬁcation of exact values than to
providing just ranking information.
5.2. RQ2: independence of irrelevant alternatives
Our second research question concerned the extent to which
the approach is affected by violations of the IIA axiom. Fig. 3 shows
the fraction of possible reversals of median ranks that was
observed in the experiments. Rank reversals do occur at a rate of
about one quarter of the possible maximum number. However,
several facts should be noted in order to put this number in
perspective: in our simulations, we systematically dropped each
alternative and checked whether eliminating this one alternative
leads to a rank reversal. By construction of the method, a scale
change that leads to a rank reversal can happen only if the
alternative dropped is the best or worst one for some group
member (which would lead to a different scaling of the utility
values). Thus, in practice, no rank reversal occurs if some other
alternatives are dropped. Furthermore, we considered all rank
reversals along the entire preference relation. In practical applica-
tions, a reversal between for example the 17th and the 18th out of
20 alternatives will probably not cause a problem, only reversals
among the ﬁrst few alternatives might lead to a different decision.
Finally, we performed a new simulation for every reduced pro-
blem, which also meant generating new random parameter
vectors. Although the sample size was large enough that different
random streams on average make no difference, in some cases this
might have slightly affected the outcome, and if it did, it would
have inﬂated the number of rank reversals.
As could be expected, increasing uncertainty about values also
increases the occurrence of rank reversals. In that case, providing
incomplete information in the form of differences leads to almost
the same results as providing it just in the form of a ranking of
alternatives. An interesting phenomenon occurs with respect to
member weights: in some cases (in particular for the large
problems of nine members and 20 alternatives) equal (and thus
ﬁxed) weights lead to more rank reversals than incomplete
information about weights. For problems with nine members,
the difference between non-dictator and general weights is again
negligible, however, for problems with only three members the
increased uncertainty of general weights is also reﬂected in a
slightly higher rate of rank reversals.
5.3. RQ3: impact of conﬂict level
Our ﬁnal research question deals with the impact of problem
characteristics, in particular the level of conﬂict among group
members, on the outcome dimensions. We measure conﬂict
indirectly, via the initial agreement between the rankings of group
members. As could be expected, if group members' rankings are in
more agreement initially, this leads to higher conclusiveness of
results, as can be observed from the scatterplots for different
information levels shown in Fig. 4 for the most complex problem.
To test this relationship statistically, we performed separate
regression analyses between the agreement level and the number
of potentially optimal alternatives for all parameter settings and
information levels. To make results comparable across parameter
settings, we divided the number of potentially optimal alternatives
by the total number of alternatives for this analysis. The results
summarized in Table 4 conﬁrm that the negative relationship
between these two variables is a robust phenomenon for all the
parameter settings we analyzed. The regression coefﬁcients of
conﬂict level are always negative, indicating that the negative
relationship which Fig. 4 illustrates for the case of nine members
and 20 alternatives also holds for the other problem sizes.
A similar effect can be observed concerning the fairness of
outcomes, as indicated in Table 5. Most regression coefﬁcients are
again negative, indicating that higher levels of initial agreement
have an equalizing effect on outcomes. This is not surprising, since
the initial level of agreement formed the denominator of our
measure of inﬂuence. However, for the most complex problem,
this relationship is reversed (although in some cases it is only
weakly signiﬁcant). In particular, when member weights are
randomly generated, a higher initial agreement leads to a higher
inﬂuence factor, which means that the numerator in IFm, i.e. the
correspondence between group rankings and the member's rank-
ing, increases even faster than the denominator.
Table 3
Average inﬂuence factors.
Values Weights All Weights All
Equal Non-dict General Equal Non-dict General
3 members 5 alternatives 9 members 5 alternatives
Card. 1.666 1.611 1.605 1.627 1.598 1.337 1.333 1.423
Diff. 1.628 1.599 1.599 1.609 1.550 1.328 1.324 1.401
Ranks 1.537 1.537 1.571 1.548 1.472 1.287 1.283 1.347
All 1.610 1.582 1.592 1.595 1.540 1.317 1.313 1.390
3 members 20 alternatives 9 members 20 alternatives
Card. 1.463 1.436 1.413 1.437 1.358 1.241 1.239 1.279
Diff. 1.458 1.434 1.412 1.435 1.354 1.240 1.238 1.277
Ranks 1.426 1.408 1.401 1.412 1.339 1.231 1.228 1.266
All 1.449 1.426 1.409 1.428 1.350 1.237 1.235 1.274
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A similar picture is obtained for the effect of initial conﬂict on
rank reversals (Table 6). The regression analysis indicates a
signiﬁcantly positive effect for large problems, indicating that
higher levels of agreement will lead to a situation in which more
rank reversals occur. However, as Fig. 5 shows, the actual number
of rank reversals does not increase much across the range of
agreement levels contained in our data, the comparatively high
coefﬁcient results from the small changes in agreement levels. The
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graph also suggests that the relationship might not be linear for
higher levels of agreement.
6. Discussion
The main research question of this paper was to study the
effects of providing different types of incomplete information in
group decision models. Our results show that providing informa-
tion on the ranking of differences, rather than just on the ranking
of alternatives, has a quite strong effect on outcomes and in some
cases even brings the results close to those obtained under
complete information. One unexpected result of our simulations
is how much the impact varies between different outcome
dimensions. It could be expected that the effect of providing
difference information is moderated by problem characteristics
such as the number of alternatives. If group members specify their
ranking of many alternatives, as well as their ranking of difference
between them, this provides a lot of information on their pre-
ferences which can be expected to lead to a clear ranking at the
group level and thus signiﬁcantly reduce the number of potentially
optimal alternatives. However, one would a priori expect that this
additional information affects all outcomes in roughly the same
way. If additional information restricts the possible number of
different rankings at the group level, this should also be reﬂected
in the other outcome dimensions. While this is the case to some
Table 4
Regression coefﬁcients between initial agreement levels and number of potentially optimal alternatives.
Values Weights Weights
Equal Non-dict General Equal Non-dict General
3 members 5 alternatives 9 members 5 alternatives
Card 0.0000 0.7091nnn 0.9622nnn 0.0000 2.1035nnn 1.8876nnn
Diff 0.4299nnn 1.0977nnn 1.2275nnn 2.0058nnn 1.9056nnn 1.6747nnn
Ranks 0.8795nnn 1.4514nnn 1.4560nnn 4.2120nnn 1.1823nnn 1.1314nnn
3 members 20 alternatives 9 members 20 alternatives
Card 0.0000 0.3716nnn 0.6428nnn 0.0000 5.4693nnn 5.2004nnn
Diff 0.1003nnn 0.5247nnn 0.7529nnn 0.5013nnn 5.4268nnn 5.2781nnn
Ranks 0.6565nnn 1.0854nnn 1.1659nnn 2.7831nnn 5.4776nnn 5.1086nnn
npo5%, nn po1%, nnnpo0:1%.
Table 5
Regression coefﬁcients between initial agreement levels and inﬂuence factors.
Values Weights Weights
Equal Non-dict General Equal Non-dict General
3 members 5 alternatives 9 members 5 alternatives
Card 2.2959nnn 2.2102nnn 2.3996nnn 2.4099nnn 0.5140nnn 0.5056nnn
Diff 2.1996nnn 2.1870nnn 2.4045nnn 2.0125nnn 0.4205nnn 0.4167nnn
Ranks 1.8864nnn 2.0200nnn 2.3803nnn 1.3117nnn 0.0715nnn 0.0729nnn
3 members 20 alternatives 9 members 20 alternatives
Card 1.7115nnn 1.5840nnn 1.5231nnn 1.1791nnn 0.0886n 0.0917n
Diff 1.6925nnn 1.5700nnn 1.5209nnn 1.1583nnn 0.0908n 0.0897n
Ranks 1.5278nnn 1.4207nnn 1.4839nnn 0.9382nnn 0.2078nnn 0.2057nnn
npo5%, nn po1%, nnnpo0:1%.
Table 6
Regression coefﬁcients between initial agreement levels and rank reversals.
Values Weights Weights
Equal Non-dict General Equal Non-dict General
3 members 5 alternatives 9 members 5 alternatives
Card 0.1092nnn 0.2686nnn 0.3991nnn 0.4743nnn 1.2012nnn 1.1276nnn
Diff 0.0027 0.0156 0.0178 0.0136 0.5270nnn 0.5750nnn
Ranks 0.0758nn 0.0408 0.0151 0.1201 0.7545nnn 0.7675nnn
3 members 20 alternatives 9 members 20 alternatives
Card 0.0092nnn 0.2769nnn 0.3364nnn 0.0454nnn 0.2999nnn 0.3749nnn
Diff 0.0676nn 0.0782nn 0.0085 0.1728n 1.7379nnn 1.7281nnn
Ranks 0.0114 0.1095nnn 0.1281nnn 0.0768 2.1069nnn 2.0556nnn
npo5%, nn po1%, nnnpo0:1%.
R. Vetschera et al. / Computers & Operations Research 51 (2014) 160–171168
extent, our results show that the magnitude of these effects varies
considerably across outcome dimensions.
Nevertheless, for many outcomes and in particular for the
number of potentially optimal alternatives, our results clearly
indicate the beneﬁts of providing preference information in the
form of a ranking of differences between adjacent alternatives. Of
course, these beneﬁts must be evaluated against the possible
disadvantages of providing such information. Any additional pre-
ference information that is required from group members also
increases the cognitive load on them. This additional burden is in
conﬂict with the main goal of decision models under incomplete
information, namely to provide easily usable tools to decision
makers.
The net beneﬁts of providing information on a ranking of
differences therefore depend on whether it is possible to develop
intuitive methods for providing such information. One possibility
is a graphical representation in the form of a slider, on which
group members can position alternatives to indicate whether they
consider neighboring alternatives to be close to each other, or far
apart. In fact, such a slider could also be used to provide cardinal
evaluations of alternatives. Interpreting positions on a slider as
exact cardinal values would, however, require users to provide a
much more precise evaluation of alternatives than if they only
need to consider whether differences are bigger or smaller.
Decision makers might be unable, or unwilling, to provide such
precise information and will probably feel more comfortable if
they know that only the ranking of differences will actually be
used in the procedure. Alternatively, pairwise comparisons about
the difference in neighboring alternatives could be elicited directly
to obtain the required information.
As we have seen, moving towards cardinal information about
alternatives not only has an impact on the conclusiveness of
results, but also makes the inﬂuence of group members less
balanced. One could argue that such unequal inﬂuence is still fair,
and if one group member has really strong feelings about the
ranking of two alternatives, this group member's opinion should
have a stronger inﬂuence than the opinion of a member to which
the two alternatives are almost the same. However, this effect also
creates an incentive for manipulation: if a member can increase
his or her inﬂuence by claiming that the difference between two
alternatives is large, then one might try to do this in order to gain
more inﬂuence. This possibility for manipulation is limited by the
fact that all alternatives must be located within a ﬁxed scale
interval, and thus claiming a large difference between two alter-
natives implies a smaller difference between other alternatives.
However, this instrument could still be used strategically, in
particular if one has some information about the preferences of
other members. A member could then assign large differences to
those pairs of alternatives about which others have a different
opinion.
These two phenomena together represent an interesting trade-
off in the design of group decision methods: eliciting more precise
(closer to cardinal) preference information from group members
on the one hand increases the conclusiveness of results, but on the
other hand provides more incentives and more opportunity for
manipulation. A better understanding of this trade-off makes it
possible to select the level of information to be used in a particular
situation, depending on the characteristics of the situation.
In addition to the different levels of information on preferences,
we also studied the effect of different types of weights. Our results
here show that for moderate to large group sizes, the non-
dictatorship condition has only a very weak effect. Even if weight
vectors are created randomly, a groupmember would only very rarely
receive a weight which is large enough to make him or her a dictator.
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While the non-dictatorship condition thus does not seem to
pose a problem for group decision models using incomplete
information, the IIA condition is more critical. Our results indicate
that IIA violations occur at a rate which cannot be ignored. As we
have already outlined in the previous section, our simulation
might somewhat exaggerate this possibility compared to those
cases of rank reversals which are really relevant in practical
applications. Still, this issue needs to be taken into account. One
consequence that we can draw for practical applications is that it
will be necessary to carefully analyze the set of alternatives at the
beginning of the decision process to avoid that alternatives need to
be added later. The problem of removing an alternative is less
important, because the group can still keep that alternative as an
artiﬁcial option that cannot be chosen but that was useful to elicit
information.
Our ﬁnal results about the impact of conﬂict levels indicate that
problem characteristics do have an inﬂuence on the phenomena
we studied. This is of course a general limitation of computational
models that they will only allow conclusions for the speciﬁc
setting being analyzed. However, our analysis of the impact of
different conﬂict levels has at least identiﬁed one factor that has
an impact on the results of such procedures, as well as some
insights in the direction and size of its effects.
7. Conclusions and future research
As the discussion in the previous section has shown, our
experiments have provided several insights into the effects of
providing different information levels in group decision models
under incomplete information. However, our study also has
several limitations which need to be taken into account in future
research, and in this section, we will outline possible strategies to
overcome those limitations.
One area which needs attention in future studies is the
reﬁnement of outcome measures. In particular, we have consid-
ered violations of the IIA axiom in a very straightforward manner
in this study. From an axiomatic point of view, any rank reversal
that occurs is a violation of the axiom, and thus all rank reversals
are equal. From a more application-oriented perspective, however,
rank reversals are of different importance. Rank reversals between
top-ranked alternatives will have an impact on actual decisions
being made by the group, while reversals of alternatives which
would not be selected anyway are not that important. Although
any weighting or classiﬁcation of rank reversals is to a certain
degree arbitrary, it still might be useful to consider only reversals
up to a certain rank, or give reversals among top-ranked alter-
natives a higher weight in calculating some severity score of rank
reversals in future studies.
Concerning the inputs to the procedure, we assumed that
group members would individually rank the alternatives without
ties. It would be possible to extend the analysis to cases in which
the group members may consider two alternatives to have the
same rank.
Another limitation of our study is that we assumed that
members provide preference information on all alternatives. In a
more general setting preference information could be provided on
a subset of the alternatives to elicit individual preferences that
might then be applied to other alternatives beyond the sample set.
However, for problems involving a limited number of alternatives,
as we are using in our simulations, one can expect the DMs are
interested in comparing all alternatives explicitly to make their
preferences clearer. We can also note that to consider full cardinal
information as an extreme benchmark case necessarily involves all
alternatives. Using only a subset of alternatives for the other cases
would confound effects of leaving out some alternatives with the
effect of providing different types of information.
Our results also indicate that contextual factors like the level of
conﬂict among group members have an impact on the information
effects we are studying. Level of conﬂict by itself is only one
measure of context, which could be further reﬁned. In particular, a
more realistic model should not just be based on the level of
conﬂict, but on those factors which inﬂuence that level. Our model
could thus be enhanced by explicitly modeling the decision
processes of members that lead to their (cardinal) evaluations of
alternatives. For example, one could model the underlying deci-
sion problem as a multi-criteria problem. Many different levels of
detail are possible in such a model. One could directly assume that
group members have certain (and different) partial values for each
alternative in each attribute. Alternatively, one could base these
values on some objective properties of the alternatives, which
would be the same for all group members, but to which group
members apply different marginal value functions. If one considers
objective attribute values of alternatives, the correlation between
these attributes might become another characteristic of the
problem that has to be taken into account.
From a formal perspective, the model we used in this study
could also be interpreted as the model of one single decision
maker, who provides incomplete information at different scale
levels on the evaluation of alternatives in several attributes.
However, this analogy is rather limited, since an individual
decision maker could also specify some (incomplete) information
on the weights of attributes, and a non-dictatorship condition
would not be appropriate in that setting.
In our view, the relationship of the present model to multi-
criteria decision making should thus be exploited by developing
integrated models, which consider both the individual-multi-
criteria decision process of group members (possibly also invol-
ving incomplete information) and the aggregation at the group
level as two distinct, but linked steps. Developing such deeper and
more realistic models of group decision problems opens a wide
area of possible extensions to our model that would probably
make our results more applicable to real life situations. Of course,
ultimately, these phenomena should be studied in the context of
actual decision problems rather than for randomly generated data.
Even within these limitations, our study offers some ﬁrst insights
into the effects of information on group decision procedures under
incomplete information.
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